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Hidden Gains: Effects of Early U.S. Compulsory Schooling Laws  





Research on early compulsory schooling laws finds minimal effects on attendance, but fails to 
investigate heterogeneous effects.  Similarly, research proposes limited contexts in which 
expansion policies can increase equality, but has difficulty separating policy and cohort effects.  
Capitalizing on within-country variation in timing of early compulsory laws, passed 1852-1918, 
I ask whether they improved equality of school attendance or educational attainment by class, 
nativity, and race.  Based on census data, compulsory laws increased equality of attendance 
and attainment, particularly among young men in the North, where the laws reduced class and 
race gaps by over 20%.  Early compulsory schooling laws provided “hidden gains,” missed in 
previous analyses, suggesting policies that raise minimum schooling can increase educational 
equality in certain contexts.  
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Politicians often note the importance of expanding education for economic growth and 
competition.  At the same time, they suggest the government can drive that expansion.  In 
January 2012, for example, President Obama called for states to extend compulsory education 
to age 18.  Furthermore, many education policies explicitly attempt to increase equality in 
schooling – whether in terms of access, quantity, or quality.  Recent examples include No 
Child Left Behind and the Texas Top Ten Percent Admission Law (Texas House Bill 588).   
Despite these current efforts, most historical research finds little effect of government 
intervention on educational expansion.  There are arguments, for example, that individual 
interests (Goldin and Katz 2008), industrialization and urbanization (Baker 1999), or demand 
for workers with new or specific skills (e.g., Trow 1961; Clark 1961) drove expansion in the 
19th and early 20th Centuries.  On a broader scale, education may expand due to population 
growth, initial education levels, or nation-building efforts, not as a function of state policies 
(Meyer et al. 1977; 1979; 1992).  These authors suggest specific government policies – 
including compulsory education laws – play little role in educational expansion.   
A competing argument emphasizes the role of the state in shaping and expanding the 
educational system (Archer 1979; Steffes 2012).  For example, Rubinson (1987) suggests the 
U.S. political system encouraged mass education and made the school system less stratified 
than in other countries.  Walters (2000) stresses the importance of an implicit (Northern) 
American school policy: meet growing demand by providing spaces and teachers for all.  In 
each of these cases, the state plays an important if subtle role in educational expansion.   
Compulsory schooling laws, which require school-age children to attend school for a 
certain amount of time, are a clear effort to expand schooling.  Most existing discussions of 
(especially early) U.S. compulsory schooling laws suggest they had little effect on attendance 
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(Landes and Solmon 1972; Edwards 1978; Goldin and Katz 2011; Tyack 1976; Lleras-Muney 
2005; Katz 1976).  Yet little research has examined early census data to test this claim and no 
existing studies investigate heterogeneous effects, which may explain previous null findings.   
Meanwhile, reforms intended to equalize educational opportunity often show limited 
success.  Whether examining trends in educational inequality or specific policies aimed at 
increasing equality of access to schooling, evidence suggests “persistent inequality” despite 
educational reform (Blossfeld and Shavit 1993) or different effects depending on context 
(Raftery and Hout 1993; Torche 2005; Post 1994; Shavit and Westerbeek 1998).  Because 
there is no within-country variation in the timing of the policies, however, these analyses 
cannot separate cohort and policy effects.   
To summarize, existing research suggests government attempts to expand education are 
largely ineffective; rather, educational expansion is driven by other factors.  Early U.S. 
compulsory schooling laws, which explicitly attempted to increase education levels, apparently 
yielded little impact on expansion.  At the same time, existing research leaves a largely 
pessimistic view of the equalizing potential of educational reform, except in certain contexts.   
Combining these two perspectives may yield different results.  Research on the effects 
of early compulsory schooling laws – the first law in each state requiring children in a given 
age range to attend school for a minimum number of weeks each year – has not addressed the 
possibility of different effects by social background.  Because the laws were geared primarily 
at lower class children, estimating only average treatment effects makes null effects more 
likely.  Similarly, studies of equalization efforts have not examined early U.S. compulsory laws, 
which should increase equality of attendance and attainment.  The laws aimed to increase 
attendance at the elementary level, where previous research suggests policies may hold the 
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greatest equalizing potential (Post 1994; Shavit and Westerbeek 1998).  Thus, capitalizing on 
within-country variation in the timing of compulsory attendance laws and North-South 
differences at the time (Post 1994; Walters 2000), the 19th century U.S. allows further 
investigation of the contexts in which expansion policies can increase educational equality. 
 Combining two previously separate literatures – educational equality and U.S. 
compulsory schooling laws – I ask whether early compulsory laws improved educational 
equality by social background, including class, nativity, and race.  Missed in previous studies 
that fail to investigate effects on equality, I find that compulsory attendance laws provided 
“hidden gains,” making social background less important for school attendance.  Results 
indicate a non-trivial equalizing effect of early compulsory laws on attendance (and attainment 
by race) and question the contexts in which reform can increase educational equality.  Below, I 
provide brief reviews of U.S. compulsory schooling laws, research on those laws, and research 
on policy efforts to equalize education, followed by hypotheses, methods and data, and results. 
 
Compulsory Schooling Laws 
Compulsory school attendance laws began with Massachusetts in 1852.  Other states in 
the North followed more quickly than the South, but by 1918 (when Mississippi passed the law) 
all states had made attendance compulsory.  The year school attendance became compulsory in 
each state is shown in supplementary Table S1.  Prior to these first compulsory attendance laws, 
only certain youth working in particular types of jobs were required to attend school.  
Compulsory attendance laws did not include any requirement to complete a certain number of 
grades, only to attend school at specified ages.  Although most states required attendance from 
ages 8 to 14, the length varied slightly by state.  For example, Connecticut and Minnesota 
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required attendance from ages 8 to 16, New Hampshire from 6 to 16, and Rhode Island and 
Wisconsin from 7 to 15. 
Compulsory laws aimed to achieve universal school attendance and were primarily 
directed at lower class and immigrant families who did not already send their children to 
school.  For example, the Commissioner of Education (1891: 493) reports, “It must be borne in 
mind that the law applies to children of tender years, whose right it is to have schooling.  If the 
misfortune or shiftlessness of parents has resulted in poverty, shall the burden of this fall upon 
young children?”  Opposition to compulsory schooling reportedly came “from the lawless and 
criminal classes; from the idle and shiftless; from those who take no interest in the education of 
their children, or care nothing for them but to get work out of them; and, of course, from those 
who have felt the penalties of the law” (1891:520).  A dissertation (Perrin 1896) and speech 
(Moore 1902) from the period portray 19th century compulsory laws as aimed at lower class 
and immigrant children, whose parents do not appreciate the value of education.  As the above 
examples illustrate, compulsory schooling laws aimed to override “neglectful” parents and 
increase attendance among lower class and immigrant youth.   
While previous research suggests the laws had no effect on school attendance (Landes 
and Solmon 1972; Goldin and Katz 2011), historical documents offer a mixed review: some 
state and city administrators saw no effect while others claim effective implementation.  While 
the term “dead letter” is often used to describe compulsory laws, the New York City 
superintendent reported in 1890 that the law was enforced and effective (Commissioner of 
Education 1891:499).  An Illinois administrator noted, “In the city of Chicago thousands of 
children have been brought into the schools through its agency.  The same thing is also true in 
other towns and cities of the state” (Commissioner of Education 1891:505).   
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Historical debates indicate that compulsory laws carried enough weight for citizens to 
take them seriously.  Discussing Connecticut’s compulsory schooling law, the Commissioner 
of Education (1891:492) quotes a Connecticut School Report: “There are many parents who 
assert what they call their rights of governance.  Such think it is unjust that they must send their 
children to school, and thus lose the profit of their labor.”  Objections to the law were outlined 
by the secretary of the state of Connecticut (Commissioner of Education 1891:493) as follows: 
1) “Such a law would create a new crime.” 2) “It interferes with the liberty of parents.” 3) “It 
arrogates new power to the government.” and 4) “It is un-American and unadapted to our free 
institutions.”  As these debates about compulsory laws illustrate, they were not insignificant at 
the time.  Nevertheless, the historical claims are almost entirely devoid of statistical evidence 
and descriptions of the laws could merely reflect the rhetorical needs of the speaker at the time.   
 
A Brief Review of Research on U.S. Compulsory Laws 
Economic arguments suggest rapid educational expansion in the early 20th century 
largely reflects individual decisions and high demand for educated workers, not policy changes 
such as compulsory laws (Goldin and Katz 2008).  Similarly, while research on later changes 
to compulsory laws find important effects (Lleras-Muney 2005; Oreopoulos 2006; Oreopoulos 
et al. 2006; Edwards 1978), the few studies of late-19th- and early-20th-century compulsory 
schooling laws find that they had little influence on the expansion of school attendance 
(Landes and Solmon 1972; Goldin and Katz 2011).  Investigating the effect of later 
compulsory laws on secondary schooling from 1910 to 1939, Goldin and Katz (2011) suggest 
that, at best, the laws accounted for six or seven percent of the increase.  This study, however, 
does not study equalizing effects of early compulsory laws on elementary school attendance.   
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In the most relevant study, Landes and Solmon (1972) use state-level census data to 
examine the effects of early laws and find that they did not increase attendance.  Several 
limitations, however, motivate further research.  First, Landes and Solmon focus primarily on 
1870 through 1890.  A more thorough analysis would include data from before attendance was 
required in the first state (Massachusetts in 1852) to after it was required in the last state 
(Mississippi in 1918).  Thus, analyses should include data from 1850 through 1920.  Second, 
although Landes and Solmon (1972) use first-differences to try to estimate the effect of a 
change in state compulsory law on a variety of school enrollment and attendance variables, 
they do not pool censuses.  They only examine changes in enrollment between two censuses at 
a time (1870-1880 and 1880-1890).  State adoption of compulsory laws was fairly slow, so 
identification rests on a small sample and leaves their analysis with low power, increasing the 
likelihood of null results.  Finally, their approach does not allow the use of state and year fixed 
effects to account for these differences.  A better approach would be to pool censuses, 
estimating the effect of compulsory laws on enrollment rates with state and year fixed effects. 
Furthermore, a recent study contradicts arguments that early compulsory laws were 
ineffective (Puerta 2009).  Using a more precise county-level difference-in-difference approach, 
limited to counties along a state border separating those with and without a change in 
compulsory attendance law between censuses, Puerta (2009) finds that compulsory laws 
increased absolute attendance rates by about seven percent.     
Regardless of their effect on absolute attendance, however, compulsory laws may have 
shifted the distribution of attendance or attainment by social background, increasing equality of 
opportunity.  Such shifts in the distribution of attendance would be hidden in previous analyses 
that fail to investigate heterogeneity.  For example, because compulsory laws were primarily 
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aimed at lower class youth, a simple average treatment effect could miss equalizing effects by 
class.  In addition, if the laws were passed as growth in attendance was slowing – in an effort to 
push the reluctant into school – research could find null or even negative effects.  In this case, 
growth in attendance would appear to decline after the compulsory laws, even if the laws were 
effective in promoting attendance among the targeted, lower class youth.   
With only one exception, no studies investigate potential heterogeneous effects by race, 
class, or nativity status.  Puerta uniquely investigates heterogeneous effects by race, finding 
greater educational gains for black than white youth, but he does not study changes in equality 
by class or nativity status.  Furthermore, the laws could have had different effects by gender, 
particularly if they influenced attendance through opportunity costs (Fishlow 1966).  Young 
men had more employment opportunities around the turn of the century and, therefore, higher 
opportunity costs, so they could show a stronger response to the compulsory laws.   
I improve on all of the above limitations of existing research by pooling 1850-1920 
census data, capitalizing on state variation in the timing of the first compulsory law, and 
investigating heterogeneous effects by class, race, and nativity status, separately by gender. 
 
A Brief Review of Research on Equalizing Policies 
Research on educational equality has found little evidence to support claims – such as 
those by politicians – that policy changes can improve equality of educational opportunity.  
Blossfeld and Shavit (1993), for example, combine analyses of an impressive 13 countries over 
time spans covering a variety of educational changes, yet find an overarching pattern of 
“persistent inequality.”  These and many single-country studies (e.g., Park 2004; Pong 1993; 
Gerber and Hout 1995), however, investigate trends in equality rather than attempting to 
identify the effects of a specific policy.   
 8 
In contrast, Raftery and Hout (1993) and Torche (2005) study particular policy changes, 
finding maintained or even increased inequality, but limit analyses to one country.  Without 
within-country variation in policy timing, these studies rely on changes across cohorts to 
identify policy effects.  They cannot separate policy and cohort effects.  That is, analyses 
relying on cohort change cannot rule out the possibility that apparent policy effects reflect 
unrelated cohort changes.  Cohort analysis is common in educational stratification (Shavit and 
Blossfeld 1993; Shavit and Westerbeek 1998; Mare 1980, 1981), but Post (1994) and Torche 
(2005) highlight its limited ability to identify causal effects.  
Other studies offer more hope for educational reform.  Whether relying on data from 
multiple countries (Breen 2010; Breen et al. 2009; Jonsson et al. 1996) or policy changes 
within a single country (Shavit and Westerbeek 1998), there is some evidence of increasing 
equality in countries throughout Europe.  Methodological differences (ordered logit as opposed 
to the Mare transition model [1980, 1981]) could explain why their results differ from those of 
Blossfeld and Shavit (Breen et al. 2009).  Alternatively, because the rising educational equality 
largely reflected increasing access to secondary school (Breen et al. 2009), it suggests 
government policy could improve educational equality through secondary expansion.  
Consistent with this argument, expansion policies in Hong Kong increased equality of 
secondary school attendance (Post 1994).  Similar to other policy analyses (Raftery and Hout 
1993; Torche 2005), however, Post (1994) cannot separate policy effects from unrelated 
changes over time because there was no within-country variation in timing.   
A complicating argument suggests the equalizing potential of expansion policies 
depends on the context.  Evidence suggests expansion can increase inequality at higher levels 
in contexts where education is free to expand (Raftery and Hout 1993; Torche 2005), but can 
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decrease inequality at lower levels of education or in contexts where the education system is 
tightly controlled by the state (Post 1994; Shavit and Westerbeek 1998).  Post (1994) suggests 
expansion policies are less likely to generate equalizing effects in demand-driven systems such 
as the Northern U.S.  Comparing compulsory effects in the U.S. North and South will provide 
more insight into contexts in which expansion policies can increase educational equality. 
To summarize, while most research examines trends in inequality across cohorts with 
inconsistent results, a few studies examine specific policy effects.  Single-country policy 
studies, however, face a key methodological limitation: there is no within-country variation in 
the timing of the policy, so they cannot separate cohort and policy effects.  Capitalizing on 
within-country variation in the timing of early U.S. compulsory attendance laws, I examine the 
effects of this expansion effort on educational equality, net of cohort and state differences.   
While Post (1994) and others (Goldin and Katz 2008; Baker 1999; Trow 1961; Clark 
1961) suggest that (at least Northern) U.S. educational expansion is largely demand-driven and 
unrelated to state policy, others emphasize the role of the state in shaping and expanding the 
U.S. educational system (Steffes 2012; Rubinson 1987; Walters 2000).  Did early U.S. 
compulsory schooling laws contribute to expansion and equality of elementary school 
attendance or attainment?  Combining two largely distinct areas of inquiry – on compulsory 
laws and policy-driven educational equality – I ask whether early compulsory schooling laws 
increased equality of school attendance and attainment by social background in the U.S.   
 
Why Compulsory Laws Might Equalize Attendance by Class: Theory and Hypotheses 
Theory suggests compulsory laws could have been an effective equalizing policy.  As 
Fishlow (1966: 427) suggests, compulsory laws should offset opportunity costs, which fall 
unequally by class.  Lower class families with fewer resources are less able to forego the wages 
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their children could earn in the labor market.  By increasing the costs of non-attendance (e.g., 
through fines or social stigma), compulsory schooling should make attendance more likely 
among lower class youth and increase equality.  If this argument is correct, effects should be 
stronger for boys, who have higher earning potential and opportunity costs than girls.  
 Relative risk aversion (RRA) theory offers an alternative explanation for a link between 
compulsory laws and equality of attendance.  People invest in more schooling to prevent 
downward mobility.  As more families send their children to school, it raises the incentive of 
other families to send their children as well, so they can attain a lifestyle similar to their parents.  
While lower class and foreign families may have avoided schooling their children before the 
laws, afterwards they would risk disadvantage if their children did not attend.  Stronger 
equalizing effects for boys could also be consistent with RRA, if families feel that a lack of 
schooling is more jeopardizing for men than women.  Either of these explanations could 
generate an equalizing effect of compulsory laws; I do not attempt to distinguish between them. 
As Hout et al. (1993:48) note, the size of the educational system must expand in order 
for opportunity to increase.  There is disagreement, however, about how control of expansion is 
related to the equalizing potential of a policy.  Post (1994) suggests expansion policies in 
tightly state-controlled systems are more likely to generate equalizing effects than in areas with 
demand-driven education systems such as the Northern U.S.  Unlike the South and Europe, 
Northern states expanded education to meet growing demand (Walters 2000); local 
administrators provided spaces and teachers for all.  Schools in the South, in contrast, faced 
greater demand for school attendance than they could (or chose to) meet, particularly among 
black and poor white youth (Anderson 1988).  Despite greater state control of educational 
expansion, which facilitated equality when coupled with compulsory laws in Hong Kong (Post 
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1994), efforts to maintain racial inequality (i.e. Jim Crow laws) likely hampered the equalizing 
potential of compulsory laws in the post-Civil War South.  Thus, because school attendance 
was not made available to all who desired it, compulsory schooling should hold less equalizing 
potential (particularly by race) in the South than in the North, where expansion met demand.   
Based on the points above, hypotheses include: 
1) compulsory schooling laws should increase equality of school attendance by 
social background (class, nativity, and race) in the late 1800s and early 1900s; 
2) compulsory schooling laws should increase equality of educational attainment; 
3) the laws should show a more robust effect on young men, who had greater 
opportunity costs of school attendance or higher risk of downward mobility from 
non-attendance than young women; and 
4) compulsory laws in non-Southern and early adopting states should show more 
robust equalizing effects, particularly by race, than in Southern states.   
 
Data and Methods 
Below I provide details about the analyses and data used to examine the equalizing 
effects of compulsory attendance laws by class, nativity, and race.1   
Attendance Analysis  
Individual census data provide school attendance, father’s occupation, nativity, race, 
state of residence, and other background information.  Analyses use census data from 1850 to 
1920, which includes information before the first and after the last law.  State data based on 
ICPSR (1970) Historical Census Data as well as original census tables provide measures of 
state characteristics which serve as controls for factors which may be related to the timing of 
the compulsory law.2  These state level controls help address concerns that the compulsory 
schooling laws were endogenous to educational expansion or equality of school attendance. 
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The sample is limited to school-age youth ages 6 to 13 who were related to the head of 
household in 1850 to 1920 censuses.3  Combining state of residence, year of state compulsory 
attendance law (Table S1), and census year, a dummy variable for compulsory school 
assignment indicates whether an individual is required to attend school in a given census year.   
School attendance is measured with an indicator for whether a child attended school 
within the last year.  Ideally attendance would be measured with more detail because daily 
school attendance was well below the number of students enrolled or registered.  For example, 
Lassonde (1996) notes about antebellum New Haven that only around 2/3 of those registered 
actually attended on a given day.  However, the attendance indicator is not a bad measure 
given the flexibility of compulsory requirements.  The laws generally required attendance for 
12 weeks, only 6 of them consecutive.  Intermittent attendance, permitted by the law, may not 
have been captured with other questions.  While this measure of attendance offers a more valid 
measure of whether a child obeyed the compulsory law, its validity still depends on accurate 
reporting.  If families lie about a child’s school attendance to give the appearance of obeying 
the law, census data would provide an invalid measure of attendance.  It is unclear, however, 
what families would have to gain by reporting inaccurate information to a census taker, since 
truant officers relied on school rather than census information and compulsory requirements 
were stricter than the census question.  However, I also examine effects of the laws on grades 
of school completed (in the 1940 census), which should echo attendance results and reduce 
possible concerns.4   
I use four different measures of social background: father’s occupational status; father’s 
occupational category; nativity status; and race.  Individuals are coded as foreign born if their 
birth place was outside the U.S. and are coded as non-white if they indicated they are any race 
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other than white.  Father’s occupation is measured using both continuous scores and 
occupation categories.  IPUMS census data provide socioeconomic index (SEI) scores 
standardized to 1950 for all of the census years.  SEI score is based on the median income and 
educational attainment associated with each occupation among men in 1950.  There were many 
changes in occupational distributions from the late 1800s to 1950, but standardized scales 
provide consistent and complete scores for all occupations across multiple census years.5  
Categorical occupational measures follow the EGP classification system, widely used in 
social mobility studies (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Hout 1989; Torche 2008), which classifies 
occupations according to how difficult it is for employers to monitor performance and specificity 
of required skills (Goldthorpe 2000).  Rather than create an algorithm to classify occupations 
myself, I use Morgan and Tang’s (2007; also used in Torche 2008) coding scheme to assign 
census occupation codes to five EGP categories.6  Results based on the categorical analysis are 
consistent with those using SEI score and are shown in the appendix. 
Analysis takes advantage of the staggered compulsory laws by state to estimate their 
effect among school-age youth by including fixed effects for state and cohort (in five-year 
intervals).  Identification is based on changes in the laws across census years.  The following 
logit model estimates the relationship between compulsory laws and the log odds of attendance 
by class.  In equation 1, CompSchool indicates whether the youth is required to attend school, 
DadOcc is father’s SEI score for individual i, X represents individual and state level measures 
at the given census year (including individual age up to a quartic and state measures related to 
























  (1) 
 
Fixed effects enable identification of compulsory effects by father’s class net of state 
and cohort differences.  The parameters of interest are 5β , 6β , and 7β , which estimate the 
interaction between compulsory law and social background.  If 5β  is significant and negative, 
it suggests the laws made school attendance more equal by class, expanding opportunity.  6β  
and 7β  should be significant and positive if the laws made attendance more equal by nativity 
and race.  I use the same model to investigate categorical effects, but indicators for father’s 
EGP occupation category replace father’s SEI in equation 1 and are interacted with compulsory 
school requirement.  Logit estimates address the potential nonlinear relationship due to high 
rates of school attendance, but linear probability models show consistent results.  Standard 
errors are corrected for state-level clustering in all models.  To further rule out competing 
explanations, I also present models that limit the sample to individuals 10 years on each side of 
the compulsory cutoff (ages 4 to 23 at the time of the law in most states, which required 
attendance until age 14) and control for age at the time of the law.   
 
Educational Attainment Analysis 
I investigate effects on educational attainment using the 1940 census – the first census 
to include educational attainment.  Data from older cohorts in this census partly address 
whether the laws had a similar effect on attendance and attainment.7  The 1940 census is not 
ideal, because compulsory education may increase longevity.  If education reduces mortality, 
as Lleras-Muney (2005) found for later extensions of compulsory school age requirements, 
individuals surviving until 1940 should under-represent those who were not required to attend 
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school and yield an under-estimate of the effect of compulsory schooling on attainment.  
Nevertheless, 1940 census data provide an attenuated estimate of the relationship between 
compulsory laws and educational equality.  Class background is not available for adults in the 
1940 census, and I do not know whether foreign born individuals were in the U.S. when they 
were school age, so attainment analysis necessarily only examines compulsory effects by race. 














Using an approach similar to the individual attendance analysis, state and cohort fixed 
effects are included in equation 2 predicting years of school attained.  In this model, non-white 
indicates racial identification of individual i, CompSchool indicates whether the individual was 
required to attend school as a child based on state of current residence, X represents controls 
for individual age up to a quartic, and u and λ  are indicators for state and cohort (in five-year 
intervals).  Analyses using compulsory assignment based on state of birth yield similar results.  
The parameter of interest is 3β , which estimates the interaction between compulsory law and 
race.  If 3β  is significantly positive, it suggests the laws increased equality of educational 
attainment.  Standard errors are corrected for state-level clustering in all models.   
As Mare (1980, 1981) noted, however, each year of education may not matter equally.  
Race or compulsory assignment may influence the likelihood of making certain educational 
transitions more than others.  Lacking complete educational history data, I cannot use the Mare 
model of educational transitions.  To investigate compulsory effects on level of educational 
attainment, I apply the same methods as Breen et al. (2009), who face the same limitation.  
Specifically, I use ordered logit models, which estimate the likelihood of completing a 
particular level of education.  Compared to the Mare model, ordered logit is more 
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parsimonious and is not sensitive to collapsing adjacent educational levels (which improves 
estimates that span long periods of time, such as this one) (Breen et al. 2009).  A limitation is 
that ordered logit models do not allow social background or compulsory assignment effects to 
vary by level of education.  Nevertheless, they offer a sensitivity check of whether compulsory 
effects are similar for both levels and years of education.  The ordered logit models use the 
same sample and measures as the OLS models, but the dependent variable measures the 
highest level of education each individual attained based on highest grade completed.  Levels 
identify those who have completed: less than grade four; at least four years, but less than 
elementary school (grades 4-7), elementary school (grade 8), some secondary school (grades 9-
11), secondary school (grade 12), and more than secondary school (grades 13 or above).      
 To capitalize on the adult measurement of educational attainment, I set up a regression 
discontinuity (RD) design by limiting the sample to cohorts 10 years on each side of the 
compulsory cutoff (ages 4 to 23 in most states, which required attendance until age 14) and 
controlling for the assignment measure (age at the time of the law).  Holding the assignment 
measure constant, RD assumes that individuals within a narrow window on each side of the 
law are similar except for whether they were required to attend school.   
All analyses discussed above are shown separately by gender and run separately by 
region (North vs. South).  Null effects in the South, however, could reflect the smaller number 
of Southern states.  Therefore, I also investigate regional differences by comparing the effects 
of compulsory laws in all states versus the effects of laws in early-adopting states (28 non-
Southern states which made attendance compulsory before 1895).   
Descriptive statistics for individual level census data are provided in Table S2.  The 
sample excludes those missing father’s SEI score (10%) and state measures (1%).  Census data 
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cannot provide information about father’s occupation among those who do not live with their 
father.  Excluding these individuals could bias results if absence of father’s information is 
related to compulsory assignment.  For example, youth could have selectively moved out of 
their parents’ home in anticipation of being required to attend school when the law passed.  
Alternatively, fathers of children who were required to attend school could have been more 
likely to leave their family (e.g., anticipating greater financial support requirements).   
At the same time, excluding those without father’s information could simply limit 
generalizability to children who lived with their father.  For example, perhaps those who do not 
live with their father are less likely to attend school regardless of state law.  In that scenario, 
the effect of the law would be weaker among those not living with their father, but excluding 
them would not affect estimated effects among those studied here.   
To investigate the extent of potential bias, Table S3 compares samples with and without 
father’s information.  On average, young men and women without father information tend to 
have smaller families, fewer siblings, and lower maximum household SEI scores.  They tend to 
be older, are more likely to be non-white, and are less likely to be in school or live on a farm.  
While nearly all are significant due to the large sample sizes, these differences are tiny and 
suggest minimal bias from excluding those with absent fathers.  In addition, only 10% of cases 
are missing information about father’s occupation (some of which could reflect unreported 
occupation rather than non-resident father), which limits the extent of any potential bias.  
Further, I only examine attendance among children ages 6 to 13, which makes it unlikely that 
individuals have left their parents’ home and reduces concern about selection out of the sample.  
Most importantly, there is no difference in compulsory assignment between those with and 
without father’s information, which suggests selective omission among those required to attend 
 18 
school is not a concern.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that results could reflect bias due 
to selection and are only generalizable to children living with their father. 
Table S4 includes 1940 census measures for attainment analysis.  Although descriptive 
statistics show strong similarity for men and women, all analyses are conducted separately by 
gender.  Supplementary Tables S2 and S4 show that attendance and attainment are indeed 
higher when school attendance was required.  Regressions below attempt to isolate the effect of 
compulsory laws.  State-level analyses are provided in the appendix. 
 
Results 
Table 1 shows results of attendance analyses by father’s SEI, nativity, and race. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The interaction between compulsory school and father’s occupational status is negative and 
significant (at p<0.1 or lower) for boys in all of the models, except when limited to the South.  
Based on the coefficients in Table 1, compulsory assignment reduced the association between 
father’s SEI and likelihood of school attendance by 27% among boys in all states, 83% in early 
adopting states, and 25% in Northern states.  The reduction does not reach significance among 
boys in Southern states, which suggests compulsory laws reduced the association between 
father’s occupational status and individual attendance, but only among boys in the North.  Thus, 
compulsory schooling made school attendance more equal by class background, but only 
outside the South.  Among young women, this interaction is only significant when including all 
states.  The interaction between compulsory school and nativity status never reaches 
significance for boys, suggesting the laws did not influence inequality by nativity.  Among 
girls, this interaction also fails to reach significance except in the South (Model 8), where the 
negative interaction suggests compulsory laws increased inequality of attendance by nativity.   
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Finally, the interaction between compulsory assignment and race is significant and 
positive in every model, which suggests the laws significantly reduced the attendance gap by 
race.  Depending on the states included, compulsory laws reduced the racial attendance gap by 
19%-30% for boys and 25%-33% for girls.  For both boys and girls, however, compulsory 
assignment appears to have increased racial equality more in the North than the South.  In both 
cases, the interaction between compulsory assignment and race is larger among those in early 
compulsory states than those in Southern states.  For boys, this interaction term is also larger in 
non-Southern than Southern states.8 
The gender difference by class suggests the laws were less potent among young women 
(except non-white women).  The stronger equalizing effects among young men are consistent 
with the argument that the laws reduced opportunity costs associated with school attendance.  
With lower earning potential, young women’s opportunity costs may have been less influenced 
by compulsory laws.  Gender differences could also be consistent with relative risk aversion 
theory.  If women’s life outcomes depended less on relative schooling (and more on marriage, 
for example), families may still have avoided sending them to school despite compulsory laws. 
Figure 1, based on Model 2 in Table 1, illustrates the weaker relationship between 
father’s SEI and the likelihood of school attendance among young men required to attend.  
Furthermore, the figure shows that compulsory assignment reduced attendance gaps by race.  
To further illustrate the relationship to class, Figure 2 shows average state attendance by 
father’s SEI category over the number of censuses from passage of the compulsory law.  There 
is a noticeable decline in the attendance gap between status groups in the censuses immediately 
before and after the compulsory law.  In addition, variation in attendance rates among the 
status groups decreases with the law.  Despite some variability before the law, after the law the 
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three status groups remain quite close together with steadily increasing attendance, although 
children from lower SEI backgrounds still have slightly lower attendance rates.  
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
In Table 1, the main effect of compulsory assignment is negative in most models, but 
generally only reaches significance in the South and is positive in the more precise models 
limited to those ten years on each side of the cutoff.9  Consistent with previous research finding 
the laws did not increase overall attendance (Landes and Solmon 1972), this could reflect the 
large increases in attendance before school became required, with the laws aimed at reluctant 
truants.  As shown in Figure 2, many high SEI and farm youth began attending before the law 
and enrollment growth declined or remained steady with the law for all except low SEI 
children.  Thus, with state and cohort fixed effects, negative main compulsory estimates are not 
surprising, despite progress in attendance among lower class youth.  By failing to examine 
heterogeneous effects of the laws, previous research missed effects among targeted youth.   
Though not conclusive, North-South differences suggest compulsory effects may have 
been less effective in the South.  In the largely agricultural economy, compulsory laws may 
have perversely increased opportunity costs for lower class youth if wages increased due to 
labor shortages.  However, unmet demand for school places in the South (Walters 2000) could 
have prevented compulsory laws from increasing opportunity through competition for school 
access.  Table S5 shows that the laws similarly increased equality by father’s occupational 
category, with greater equalizing effects among boys and in early-adopting, Northern states.   
To summarize, individual analyses suggest the laws reduced inequality in school 
attendance by class and race.  Compulsory laws weakened the relationship between social 
background and school attendance, especially among young men in the North, where 
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compulsory assignment reduced the class and race gaps by 25% and 30%, respectively.  State 
level regression analyses, shown in the appendix, echo these equalizing effects. 
School attendance was increasing throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s.  As Hout 
et al. (1993) point out, as a given transition becomes nearly universal, inequality approaches 
zero.  Importantly, however, attendance was not universal until about two censuses after the 
law (see Figure 2) and was generally around 70% (80% among high SEI youth) at the time of 
the law.  There was substantial room for improvement, so results are not simply due to school 
attendance becoming universal.   
 [Table 2 and Figure 3 about here] 
Educational attainment results (Table 2) suggest similar equalizing effects.  Among 
both men and women in OLS and ordered logit models, attainment is substantially and 
significantly lower among non-whites.  Net of state and cohort differences, individuals 
required to attend school completed slightly (but not always significantly) more years of school.  
Most importantly, however, compulsory assignment yielded a significantly greater boost in 
attainment for non-whites than whites.  Figure 3 illustrates the interaction between compulsory 
school and race among women (Model 1 in Table 2).  Among women who were never required 
to attend school as children, whites completed 3.4 more grades in school than non-whites on 
average.  Among women required to attend school, however, this gap decreases by 22% to 2.7 
grades.  This equalizing effect of compulsory assignment holds in OLS models predicting 
grades completed and in ordered logit models predicting the conditional likelihood of 
completing education levels.  The interaction terms remain at least marginally significant in all 
models, with only two exceptions.  In both OLS and ordered logit models, women in early 
states and men in Southern states did not experience significant gains in racial equality.  
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Coupled with smaller interaction effects in Southern states for men and women, this null effect 
for men in the South is consistent with hypothesis 4 and suggests compulsory laws were less 
able to equalize educational attainment in the South than the North.  Consistent with hypothesis 
3, the null effect among women in early adopting states suggests the laws had a less robust 
effect on women, who had lower opportunity costs of education. 
While class and nativity cannot be investigated, the positive interaction effects by race 
suggest compulsory schooling laws made educational attainment more equal by social 
background.  Depending on gender and states included, compulsory assignment reduced the 
racial attainment gap by at least 6% outside the South (and as much as 53% among men in 
early adopting states).  Thus, echoing attendance results, attainment results also suggest that 
compulsory laws increased educational equality, particularly among men outside the South.    
 
Conclusion 
Evidence suggests that early compulsory laws had different effects by class, nativity, 
and race, increasing educational equality.  While previous studies find little evidence of 
absolute effects (Landes and Solmon 1972), I investigate heterogeneous effects by social 
background and find evidence of hidden gains.  Supporting hypothesis 1, results show 
compulsory laws increased equality of school attendance by class and race (and by nativity 
status at the state level).  Consistent with hypothesis 2, compulsory assignment increased 
equality of educational attainment by race.  In both cases, supporting hypothesis 3, these 
equalizing effects were more robust among young men, suggesting the laws may have 
influenced attendance equality through opportunity costs or relative risk aversion. 
Existing educational research offers a primarily pessimistic view of educational reform 
(Blossfeld and Shavit 1993; Rosenberg 1991; Raftery and Hout 1993; Torche 2005) or 
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suggests expansion policies only decrease inequality in contexts where the education system is 
not demand-driven but tightly state-controlled (Post 1994).  These studies, however, are limited 
in their ability to separate cohort and policy effects.  Capitalizing on within-country variation 
in timing and net of cohort and state differences, I find the equalizing effects of early U.S. 
compulsory laws were more robust in the North than the South, consistent with hypothesis 4.   
Contrary to Post (1994), my findings suggest that compulsory laws were more effective 
at increasing equality in the largely demand-driven system of the Northern U.S. (Walters 2000).  
My results could differ from Post’s (1994) contention that expansion policies are more 
effective in tightly controlled systems for several reasons: methods (within-country variation, 
controlling for state and cohort differences); setting (Hong Kong vs. the U.S.); the 
discriminatory system of inequality in the post-Civil War South; or dimensions of inequality 
examined.  Post investigates class inequality, not race or nativity.  While I cannot tease out 
which of these explain the difference, my results appear to complicate existing arguments and 
suggest that expansion policies can yield different effects by both context and dimension of 
inequality.  This complex three-way interaction could help explain previous evidence of 
persistent inequality and the apparent ineffectiveness of policy efforts.  Further research should 
test this potential three-way relationship and tease out contexts and dimensions of inequality 
along which policy efforts can best increase educational equality. 
Robust evidence of greater equality in attendance and attainment could of course mask 
persistence of inequality at important transition points, such as entry to secondary school (Mare 
1981).  Growth in the size of the system, for example, could encourage elites to maintain their 
relative advantage by attaining higher credentials (Collins 1971; Raftery and Hout 1993).  
However, results from ordered logit models (Table 2, Panel B) suggest compulsory assignment 
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increased equality in level of educational attainment, which reduces concern about this type of 
inflation.  Furthermore, in the late 1800s, simply attending school was an important transition.  
While this analysis cannot determine whether compulsory laws influenced equality at higher 
transition points, it supports existing research (Shavit and Westerbeek 1998) with evidence that 
the laws increased opportunity at lower levels of education, including school attendance.  
While Raftery and Hout (1993) point out that equality is expected as a level of education 
approaches saturation, attendance was hardly universal at around 70% (80% for high SEI youth) 
shortly before and after the laws.   
Consistent with authors who emphasize the role of the state in shaping and expanding 
the U.S. educational system (Steffes 2012; Rubinson 1987; Walters 2000), I find that early U.S. 
compulsory schooling laws contributed to expansion and equality of elementary school 
attendance and attainment.  Results provide consistent evidence of “hidden gains,” which were 
missed in previous research that only estimated average treatment effects of the laws.  These 
hidden gains suggest reforms which raise the minimum level of schooling can increase equality 
at that level, at least in a developing context where schools expand to meet growing demand.  
In January 2012, President Obama called for states to extend compulsory education in 
the U.S. to age 18.  This analysis of 18th and 19th century U.S. data may hold limited relevance 
for the contemporary world, because of globalization or the current knowledge economy, for 
example.  However, if states continue to meet rising space and teacher requirements and if skill 
demands continue to rise, results suggest raising the compulsory schooling age to 18 could 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Logit Coefficients from Individual Analysis of School Attendance by Class, Nativity, and Race 
    In School 
    Young Men Young Women 
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   
    All States 
Early States 
10-yr Non-South  South All States 
Early States 
10-yr Non-South  South 
Comp School -0.134 + 0.244   -0.092 
 
-0.246 * -0.196 * 0.113   -0.179 + -0.229 * 
    (0.069) 
 
(0.200)   (0.090) 
 
(0.108)   (0.086) 
 
(0.213)   (0.106) 
 
(0.105)   
Father's SEI 0.011 * 0.006 * 0.008 * 0.013 * 0.010 * 0.004 * 0.006 * 0.014 * 
    (0.001) 
 
(0.001)   (0.001) 
 
(0.001)   (0.001) 
 
(0.002)   (0.001) 
 
(0.001)   
Foreign   -1.302 * -1.121 * -1.218 * -1.938 * -1.001 * -0.873 * -0.858 * -2.079 * 
    (0.194) 
 
(0.218)   (0.151) 
 
(0.450)   (0.197) 
 
(0.181)   (0.130) 
 
(0.111)   





(0.468)   (0.137) 
 
(0.083)   (0.060) 
 
(0.267)   (0.107) 
 
(0.062)   
Comp School * Father's SEI -0.003 * -0.005 * -0.002 + 0.003   -0.002 * -0.001   0.001 
 





(0.002)   (0.001) 
 
(0.002)   (0.001) 
 
(0.002)   (0.001) 
 
(0.001)   
Comp School * Foreign 0.052 
 
-0.150   0.162 
 
-0.268   -0.054 
 







(0.297)   (0.150) 
 
(0.223)   (0.142) 
 
(0.292)   (0.132) 
 
(0.134)   
Comp School * Non-White 0.222 * 0.421 + 0.437 * 0.197 * 0.307 * 0.521 * 0.280 * 0.302 * 
    (0.079)   (0.238)   (0.096)   (0.096)   (0.080)   (0.216)   (0.133)   (0.096)   
N   302319   26955   196305   106014   295537   25872   192337   103200   
* p<.05; + p<.10  Standard errors are adjusted for state level clustering. 
Source: 1850-1920 IPUMS Census data.  Sample includes 6-13 year old children related to head of household. 
All models include controls for age up to a quartic, rural residence, group quarters residence, and time-varying state measures found related to the timing of early 
state laws: % manufacturing employment, % white illiteracy, % adjacent states with the law, % elderly, % foreign, years in union, manufacturing production 
per employee, and time varying % adjacent states and % elderly.  Indicators for each state and cohort (in 5-year intervals) are included.  
Early states made attendance compulsory before 1895.  Models labeled 10-year are limited to 10 birth cohorts on each side of the compulsory cutoff and include 
controls for age at time of compulsory law and its interaction with compulsory assignment. 
Results are similar by father’s occupational category, shown in appendix Table S5.   
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Table 2: Coefficients from Individual Analysis of Educational Attainment by Race, 1940 Census 
Panel A: OLS Coefficients – Predicting Grades of School Completed 
  Highest Grade Completed 





10-yr RD Non-South South 
Comp School 0.139 
 
0.034   0.097   0.610 * 
  (0.091) 
 
(0.128)   (0.092) 
 
(0.180)   
Non-White -3.239 * -4.452 * -2.762 * -3.390 * 
  (0.145) 
 
(0.748)   (0.127) 
 
(0.172)   
Comp School*Non-White 0.199 + 2.343 * 0.599 * -0.177   
  (0.119)   (0.617)   (0.107)   (0.116)   
N 314431 
 
11582   211363 
 
103068   
                  
  Women 
Comp School 0.142 * 0.194 + 0.145 + 0.394 * 
  (0.077) 
 
(0.097)   (0.072) 
 
(0.176)   
Non-White -3.426 * -3.970 * -2.870 * -3.569 * 
  (0.135) 
 
(0.745)   (0.135) 
 
(0.155)   
Comp School*Non-White 0.750 * 1.231   0.883 * 0.449 * 
  (0.107)   (0.835)   (0.137)   (0.128)   
N 319922 
 
12693   215099 
 
104823   
 
Panel B: Ordered Logit Coefficients – Predicting Level of School Completed 
  Education Level Completed 
  Men 
  
All  
(Age 25+)  
Early States 
10-yr RD Non-South South 
Comp School 0.087 + 0.050   0.073   0.263 * 
  (0.048) 
 
(0.068)   (0.050) 
 
(0.081)   
Non-White -1.928 * -2.712 * -1.769 * -1.843 * 
  (0.087) 
 
(0.476)   (0.091) 
 
(0.097)   
Comp School*Non-White 0.160 * 1.325 * 0.452 * 0.030   
  (0.070)   (0.420)   (0.072)   (0.061)   
N 314431 
 
11582   211363 
 
103068   
                  
  Women 
Comp School 0.098 * 0.119 * 0.099 * 0.177 * 
  (0.044) 
 
(0.060)   (0.043) 
 
(0.088)   
Non-White -2.096 * -2.331 * -1.937 * -1.970 * 
  (0.084) 
 
(0.472)   (0.092) 
 
(0.094)   
Comp School*Non-White 0.471 * 0.776   0.705 * 0.332 * 
  (0.077)   (0.525)   (0.096)   (0.068)   
N 319922 
 
12693   215099 
 
104823   
* p<.05; + p<.10  Source: 1940 Census.  All models include controls for age up to a quartic and indicators for 
each state and cohort (5-year intervals) not shown. Standard errors are adjusted for state level clustering and 
individuals are weighted to represent the population. RD models control for age at the time of the law (the 
assignment variable) and its interaction with compulsory assignment. 
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Figure 1: Predicted School Attendance by Father’s SEI, Nativity, and Race: Young Men in 
Early States 
 
Based on Model 2 in Table 1; 10-year-old boy in New York (non-compulsory) or New Hampshire (compulsory). 
The association between father’s SEI score and likelihood of school attendance is significantly weaker (p<.05) for 
boys required to attend school. Non-white boys have a stronger association between father’s SEI and 
attendance, but compulsory assignment increases the likelihood of attendance more strongly for non-white 
than white boys (p<0.1). Compulsory assignment increases equality by class and race, but not nativity status 
in this model. Three-way interactions between compulsory assignment, father’s SEI,and foreign or non-white 
are not significant. 
 
Figure 2: State School Attendance by SEI Category – Young Men in All States 
 
Figure 2 traces mean state attendance rates (of boys ages 6-13) separately by father’s SEI category over the 
number of censuses from the time of the compulsory attendance law.  The vertical lines represent the 
censuses immediately before and after the compulsory law.  There was a large class gap in attendance rates 
before the law (approximately 0.2).  That gap narrowed to less than 0.1 in the census immediately after the 
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Low SEI (Father's SEI<14)
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Figure 3: Educational Attainment by Compulsory School and Race – Women in All States 
 
Figure 3 is based on Model 1 in Table 2, Panel A for women in all states. 
There are significant educational attainment differences between white and non-white women, whether or not they 
were required to attend school.  Furthermore, educational attainment is higher among both white and non-
white women who were required to attend school.  The racial attainment gap, however, is significantly lower 
among those required to attend school, suggesting that compulsory laws reduced inequality in educational 














Appendix: Supplementary Material 
 
State Level Attendance Analysis 
To supplement individual analyses, I estimate compulsory effects on attendance at the 
state level.  Most state-year measures are gathered from ICPSR (1970) Historical Census Data 
1790-1970.  However, these data do not always include appropriate or consistent measures 
across censuses and are therefore supplemented with information from original census tables 
and a compilation of statistical abstracts (US Bureau of the Census 1975).  Behrens et al. (2003) 
provide incarceration, male unemployment, and governor partisanship data.10   
Attendance rates by class, nativity, and race are created from collapsed individual 
census attendance data (weighted to represent the population) to produce state attendance rates 
among school-age children by father’s SEI score, father’s occupation category, nativity, and 
race.  For example, I construct average attendance rates among foreign and native boys in each 
state at each census year.  I follow the same process by race and class category, to examine 
effects by class background, nativity, and race separately.  Youth are divided into high 
(SEI>14), farm (SEI=14), and low (SEI<14) occupational status categories based on father’s 
SEI score and into the five occupational categories for the analysis by EGP categories.11 
 Using state measures from 1850 to 1920, average state attendance rates are first 
graphed by census from the law and social background to illustrate how attendance rates 
changed with the law (Figure 2).  Next, regressions including state and year fixed effects help 
identify whether compulsory schooling effects differ by social background. 













In equation S1, attendance rate is the proportion of youth enrolled in school in state i and year j 
for each class k; DadOcc includes indicators for each occupational category or status group; 
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CompSchool indicates whether a particular state has made school attendance compulsory at 
each year; X represents controls for factors related to the timing of compulsory schooling laws; 
and u and λ  include indicators for each state and census year.  The parameters of interest are
k2β , which estimate the relationship between a compulsory law and attendance for each class 
or status group.  Separate regressions substitute foreign or non-white indicators for father’s 
occupation.  Results shown are weighted by state male and female school-age population size, 
but results are similar without weights.  Table S6 includes descriptive statistics for the state 
level analyses, excluding the state-year observations with missing data (11%).   
 
State-Level Results 
Tables S7A and S7B show state level regression results.  As in individual analyses, the 
interaction terms suggest the laws significantly reduced differences in school attendance by 
social background – whether measured in terms of father’s occupational status or category, 
individual nativity status, or race.  When class is measured categorically, the effect of 
compulsory laws on children of lower non-manual workers is not significantly different from 
the main effect on upper non-manual children (the omitted category).  However, the laws 
significantly increased attendance of manual and agricultural classes more than children of 
upper non-manual fathers, with the largest effect on children of non-skilled manual workers.  
The laws significantly reduced attendance gaps by status, nativity, and race as well.  Thus, as 
in the individual level analyses, attendance rates are more similar after the law than before.  
Contrary to individual analyses, however, results are similar by gender. 
According to Raftery and Hout (1993), compulsory laws should only increase equality 
once attendance has reached saturation among upper class children.  To address this possibility, 
I create a state-level measure of saturation – measured in each state at each census year, 
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separately by gender – which indicates whether the state attendance rate among high SEI or 
upper non-manual boys or girls is at least 95%.  Including this indicator as a control in state-
level models yields similar results.  In addition, I investigate whether any equalizing effects of 
the compulsory laws depend on saturation by including a three-way interaction between 
compulsory law, saturation, and class, nativity, or race (and all two-way interactions).  In only 
two cases was there a significant three-way interaction (the three-way interactions of foreign 
and non-skilled manual background with compulsory and upper non-manual saturation), both 
occurring only when predicting attendance of girls but not boys.  In all other cases, equalizing 
effects of the laws were unrelated to saturation of either upper non-manual or high SEI children.  
Thus, while the ability of compulsory laws to increase equality of attendance among girls in 
some cases depends on saturation among upper class girls, for the most part compulsory laws 
increased equality of attendance regardless of upper class saturation.     
Model 5 in Table S7A represents the naïve approach, estimating the average treatment 
effect with no interaction terms.  As in past research (Landes and Solmon 1972), this model 
suggests early compulsory laws had no effect on overall attendance rates for boys or girls.  
However, as shown in Models 1 through 4, this average treatment effect masks the equalizing 
effect of the laws – the “hidden gains” for lower class, foreign, and non-white children. 
 Table S7B compares state level results in Southern and non-Southern states.  Outside 
the South, compulsory laws increased equality of attendance by occupational status, 
occupational category, nativity, and race among both boys and girls.  In the South, however, 
compulsory laws did not increase equality by nativity.  In addition, the laws had a smaller 
equalizing effect by race in the South, reducing the attendance gap by 64% (0.158 ÷ -0.245 =   
-0.64) in the North, but only 42% (0.083 ÷ -0.198 = -0.42) in the South.  At the same time, 
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compulsory laws often had a larger equalizing effect by father’s occupational status and 
category in the North than the South.  For example, among sons of fathers with low-SEI 
occupations, the attendance rate gap between them and sons of high-SEI fathers decreased 
about 67% (0.075÷-0.112=-0.67) with the laws outside the South compared to 50% (0.117÷-
0.236=-0.50) in Southern states.   
These results suggest that compulsory laws carried more robust equalizing potential in 
the North.  The laws increased equality in both the North and the South, but along different 
dimensions.  In the South, they promoted equality of attendance by class and race, but not 
nativity status.  In the North, compulsory laws promoted equality along all dimensions, and in 
most cases more strongly than in the South.  Thus, the same policy could increase equality 
more strongly in one context more than another (e.g., North vs. South) and along different 
dimensions across contexts.  These results suggest the equalizing potential of an educational 








      
Massachusetts 1852 
District of Columbia 1864 
Vermont 1867 
Michigan, New Hampshire, Washington 1871 
Connecticut, New Mexico 1872 
Nevada 1873 
California, Kansas, New York 1874 




Illinois, Montana, N./S. Dakota, Rhode Island 1883 
Minnesota 1885 
Nebraska, Idaho 1887 
Colorado, Oregon 1889 
Utah 1890 
Pennsylvania 1895 
Hawaii, Kentucky 1896 
Indiana, West Virginia 1897 
Arizona 1899 
Iowa, Maryland 1902 
Missouri, Tennessee 1905 













Table S2: Descriptive Statistics – Individual Level Analysis 
    Young Men Young Women 
    All Std.  Comp Non-Comp All Std.  Comp Non-Comp 










  Comp School 0.58 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.58 0.49 1.00 0.00 
  In School 0.77 0.42 0.86 0.62 0.77 0.42 0.88 0.62 
  Father's SEI  21.83 18.84 23.82 18.67 21.99 18.96 24.21 18.88 
  Upper Non-Manual* 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.08 
  Lower Non-Manual* 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.02 
  Skilled Manual* 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.10 0.17 0.37 0.21 0.10 
  Non-Skilled Manual* 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.40 0.23 0.17 
  Agriculture* 0.50 0.50 0.41 0.64 0.49 0.50 0.39 0.63 
  Foreign 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.01 
  Non-White 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.16 
  Age 9.33 2.29 9.22 9.30 9.31 2.29 9.34 9.27 
  Rural 0.70 0.46 0.60 0.85 0.69 0.46 0.59 0.84 
  Group Quarters 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
  Cohort (5-yr intervals) 1888 22.39 1901 1869 1889 22.33 1902 1870 










  % Illiterate 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.18 Same as for young men 
  % White Illiterate 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.10 
      % Foreign 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.10 
      % Manuf Empl 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.04 
      Manuf Prod per Empl 3.49 2.69 4.60 1.68 
      % Elderly 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 
      % Adjacent States 0.58 0.43 0.86 0.14 
      Democrat Governor‡ 0.46 0.50 0.40 0.56 
      Years since Union 81.19 33.60 90.18 66.92 
      Incarceration Rate† 77.27 41.71 77.62 78.64 
      % Non-White Prisoners§ 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.32 
      N 303293   191431 127753 296403   172631 123772 
  N* 299972   189931 125745 293032   171319 121713 
  N‡ 302319   191431 126779 295537   172631 122906 
  N† 302934   191159 127650 296034   172375 123659 
  N§ 291433   185686 120361 284485   168209 116276 
Source: 1850-1920 IPUMS Census data.  Sample includes 6-13 year old children related to head of household and 




Table S3: Comparison of Individuals with and without Father’s Occupation Information 
    Young Men Young Women 





Info All   





    
  Comp School 0.58 0.58 0.00 0.58 0.58 0.00 
  In School 0.77 0.76 -0.01 0.77 0.77 -0.01 
  Foreign 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
  Non-White 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.01 
  Age 9.33 9.35 0.03 9.31 9.34 0.03 
  Rural 0.70 0.69 0.00 0.69 0.69 -0.01 
  Group Quarters 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Family Size 6.83 6.72 -0.11 6.84 6.73 -0.11 
  Number of Siblings 3.66 3.54 -0.12 3.66 3.54 -0.12 
  Max Household SEI 24.72 24.21 -0.51 24.91 24.43 -0.49 
  Birth Year 1886.49 1886.46 -0.03 1886.63 1886.59 -0.04 
  Not Working 0.94 0.94 0.00 0.98 0.98 0.00 
  Farm Resident 0.46 0.45 -0.02 0.45 0.44 -0.02 
  Cohort (5-yr intervals) 1888.46 1888.43 -0.03 1888.61 1888.57 -0.04 





    
  % Illiterate 0.11 0.12 0.00 Same as for young men 
  % White Illiterate 0.07 0.07 0.00     
  % Foreign 0.13 0.13 0.00     
  % Manuf Empl 0.07 0.07 0.00     
  Manuf Prod per Empl 3.49 3.48 -0.02     
  % Elderly 0.04 0.04 0.00     
  % Adjacent States 0.58 0.58 0.00     
  Democrat Governor‡ 0.46 0.46 0.01     
  Years since Union 81.19 81.48 0.28     
  Incarceration Rate† 77.27 77.67 0.41     
  % Non-White Prisoners§ 0.25 0.26 0.01     
  N 303293 337907 10% 296403 330472 10% 
  N‡ 302319 336770 10% 295537 329435 10% 
  N† 302934 337505 10% 296034 330058 10% 
  N§ 291433 324095 10% 284485 316609 10% 
Source: 1850-1920 IPUMS Census data.  Sample includes 6-13 year old children related to head of household and 
excludes those missing state measures (1%). 
Young men and women without father information tend to have smaller families, fewer siblings, and lower 
maximum household SEI scores. They tend to be older, non-white, and less likely to be in school or live on a 
farm. While nearly all are significant due to the large sample sizes, these differences are tiny and suggest 




Table S4: Descriptive Statistics: Educational Attainment – 1940 Census 
    Men Women 
    All Std. Comp Non-Comp All Std. Comp Non-Comp 
    Mean Dev. Mean Mean Mean Dev. Mean Mean 
All; Age 25+   
  
  
   
  
  Comp School 0.78 0.41 1.00 0.00 0.79 0.41 1.00 0.00 
  Highest Grade Completed 8.60 3.64 9.09 6.86 8.92 3.41 9.37 7.27 
  Education Level Completed 3.37 1.46 3.55 2.73 3.53 1.43 3.70 2.89 
  Non-White 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.21 0.10 0.31 0.08 0.20 
  Age 44.12 14.20 39.96 59.02 44.16 14.44 39.98 59.43 
  Cohort (5 yr intervals) 1898 14.17 1902 1883 1898 14.43 1902 1883 
  N  314431   245378 69053 319922   251099 68823 
Early States 10-yr RD sample   
  
  
   
  
  Comp School 0.74 0.44 1.00 0.00 0.73 0.44 1.00 0.00 
  Highest Grade Completed 7.87 3.36 8.02 6.36 8.32 3.02 8.43 8.03 
  Education Level Completed 3.05 1.31 3.09 2.95 3.25 1.26 3.28 3.14 
  Non-White 0.01 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.01 
  Age 70.90 6.67 35.09 56.14 71.25 6.82 68.94 77.65 
  Cohort (5 yr intervals) 1871 6.83 1907 1886 1871 6.95 1873 1864 
  N 11582   8604 2978 12693   9323 3370 
Non-South   
  
  
   
  
  Comp School 0.88 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.88 0.33 1.00 0.00 
  Highest Grade Completed 9.21 3.27 9.43 7.69 9.45 3.04 9.64 8.03 
  Education Level Completed 3.37 1.46 3.68 3.00 3.73 1.32 3.81 3.15 
  Non-White 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.11 
  Age 44.21 14.19 41.50 63.79 44.41 14.50 41.62 64.77 
  Cohort (5 yr intervals) 1898 14.17 1900 1878 1897 14.49 1900 1877 
  N  211363   185709 25654 215099   189269 25830 
South   
  
  
   
  
  Comp School 0.58 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.59 0.49 1.00 0.00 
  Highest Grade Completed 7.32 4.01 8.02 6.36 7.81 3.86 8.51 6.80 
  Education Level Completed 2.90 1.54 3.15 2.57 3.10 1.54 3.35 2.73 
  Non-White 0.22 0.42 0.20 0.26 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.26 
  Age 43.93 14.20 35.09 56.14 43.64 14.30 34.90 56.17 
  Cohort (5 yr intervals) 1898 14.18 1907 1886 1898 14.28 1907 1886 
  N 103068   59669 43399 104823   61830 42993 
Source: 1940 IPUMS Census. Sample excludes foreign born and individuals under age 25 in 1940, who were born 




Table S5: Logit Coefficients from Individual Analysis of School Attendance by Father’s Occupation Category, Nativity, and Race 
    In School 
    Men Women 
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   
  All States 
Early States 
10-yr Non-South South All States 
Early States 
10-yr Non-South South 
Lower Non-Manual -0.128 * -0.128   -0.069   -0.271 * 0.042 
 
0.054   0.011 
 
-0.035   
    (0.049) 
 
(0.095)   (0.052) 
 
(0.065)   (0.062) 
 
(0.162)   (0.099) 
 
(0.058)   
Skilled Manual -0.362 * -0.172 * -0.214 * -0.485 * -0.258 * -0.013   -0.079 
 
-0.434 * 
    (0.048) 
 
(0.086)   (0.070) 
 
(0.053)   (0.059) 
 
(0.093)   (0.062) 
 
(0.078)   
Non-Skilled Manual -0.628 * -0.308 * -0.441 * -0.828 * 0.536 * -0.195 * -0.331 * -0.771 * 
    (0.060) 
 
(0.098)   (0.067) 
 
(0.059)   (0.066) 
 
(0.087)   (0.055) 
 
(0.081)   
Agriculture -0.551 * -0.217 * -0.280 * -0.739 * -0.480 * -0.084   -0.166 * -0.719 * 
    (0.074) 
 
(0.073)   (0.097) 
 
(0.055)   (0.081) 
 
(0.114)   (0.080) 
 
(0.067)   
Foreign   -0.961 * -0.916 * -0.899 * -1.275 * -0.819 * -0.691 * -0.724 * -1.362 * 
    (0.129) 
 
(0.147)   (0.129) 
 
(0.231)   (0.139) 
 
(0.177)   (0.113) 
 
(0.273)   
Non-White -1.001 * -1.297 * -1.182 * -0.938 * -1.002 * -1.320 * -0.981 * -0.955 * 
    (0.062) 
 
(0.199)   (0.074) 
 
(0.062)   (0.054) 
 
(0.228)   (0.083) 
 
(0.055)   
Comp School -0.377 * -0.028   -0.235 * -0.071   -0.336 * 0.058   -0.132 
 
-0.179   
    (0.087) 
 
(0.225)   (0.093) 
 
(0.204)   (0.101) 
 
(0.245)   (0.111) 
 
(0.137)   
Comp*Lower Non-Manual 0.100 + 0.105   0.092 
 
-0.020   -0.064 
 
-0.284   0.019 
 
-0.218 * 
    (0.059) 
 
(0.212)   (0.073) 
 
(0.125)   (0.102) 
 
(0.204)   (0.150) 
 
(0.105)   
Comp*Skilled Manual 0.183 * 0.213   0.135 * -0.134   0.091 
 
-0.001   -0.044 
 
0.070   
    (0.051) 
 
(0.135)   (0.068) 
 
(0.086)   (0.071) 
 
(0.124)   (0.081) 
 
(0.148)   
Comp*Non-Skilled Manual 0.267 * 0.189   0.166 * 0.079   0.177 * 0.054   0.049 
 
0.088   
    (0.056) 
 
(0.163)   (0.061) 
 
(0.107)   (0.053) 
 
(0.130)   (0.045) 
 
(0.105)   
Comp*Agriculture 0.168 * 0.283 * 0.066 
 
-0.165   0.087 * 0.058   -0.081 
 
-0.085   
    (0.067) 
 
(0.120)   (0.093) 
 
(0.115)   (0.061) 
 
(0.112)   (0.069) 
 
(0.114)   
Comp * Foreign 0.063 
 
-0.104   0.174 
 
-0.435 * -0.049 * -0.041   0.051 
 
-0.396 * 
    (0.164) 
 
(0.284)   (0.151) 
 
(0.208)   (0.134) 
 
(0.285)   (0.132) 
 
(0.126)   
Comp * Non-White 0.239 * 0.388   0.454 * 0.180 + 0.325 * 0.589 * 0.273 * 0.310 * 
    (0.078)   (0.252)   (0.101)   (0.095)   (0.078)   (0.219)   (0.129)   (0.094)   
N   299014   26554   193984   105030   292180   25467   190023   102157   
* p<.05; + p<.10. Standard errors are adjusted for state level clustering. Controls and sample are the same as in Table 1. Omitted category is upper non-manual. 
Compulsory laws reduced inequality for some class backgrounds among young men, but only outside the South. The laws significantly reduced gaps by race.  
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Table S6: Descriptive Statistics: State Level Analysis 
    Young Men Young Women 
  
 
All Std. Comp Non-Comp All Std. Comp Non-Comp 
    Mean Dev. Mean Mean Mean Dev. Mean Mean 
  Comp School 0.58 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.59 0.49 1.00 0.00 
  In School 0.77 0.20 0.88 0.62 0.77 0.19 0.88 0.62 
Father's SEI and Occup Cats 
   
  
   
  
  High Father's SEI (>14) 0.36 0.48 0.44 0.24 0.35 0.48 0.44 0.23 
  Farming Father (SEI=14) 0.43 0.50 0.34 0.56 0.43 0.50 0.34 0.57 
  Low Father's SEI (<14) 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.20 
  Upper Non-Manual 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.08 
  Lower Non-Manual 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.02 
  Skilled Manual 0.17 0.37 0.21 0.10 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.10 
  Non-Skilled Manual 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.18 
  Agriculture 0.49 0.50 0.39 0.63 0.48 0.50 0.38 0.62 
State Characteristics 
   
  
   
  
  % Illiterate 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.18 Same as for young men 
  % White Illiterate 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.10 
      % Foreign 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.10 
      % Manuf Empl 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.04 
      Manuf Prod per Empl 3.48 2.68 4.78 1.69 
      % Elderly 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 
      % Adjacent States 0.58 0.43 0.91 0.14 
      Democrat Governor† 0.45 0.50 0.38 0.56 
      Years since Union 81 34 92 67 
      Incarceration Rate‡ 77.22 41.79 76.27 78.54 
      % Non-White Prisoners§ 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.32 
      Year 1896 22 1910 1877 
      N 851 
 
405 446 847 
 
403 444 





  N‡ 842 
 
399 443 838 
 
397 441 
  N§ 825   399 426 819   397 422 
Sources: 1850-1920 Census data; ICPSR (1970) Historical Census Data 1790-1970; US Bureau of the Census 
1975; Behrens et al. 2003.  School attendance and father’s occupation measures are aggregated from IPUMS 
Census data, including 6-13 year old white children related to head of household and excluding foreign born 
age 8 or over. 
N indicates number of state-year-status group observations and excludes those missing state measures (11%). 
Descriptive statistics for the state level data sets by EGP category, nativity status, and race are the same but with 
different numbers of observations (because there are 5 EGP categories, 2 nativity statuses, and 2 racial 




Table S7A: Coefficients from State Analysis of Attendance Rate by Class, Nativity, and Race 
Model   Attendance Rate 
    Young Men Young Women 
    Coeff   Std Error Coeff   Std Error 
1  SEI Farm (SEI=14) -0.065 * (0.007) -0.060 * (0.008) 
  Low SEI (SEI<14) -0.171 * (0.009) -0.159 * (0.009) 
  Comp School -0.055 * (0.011) -0.064 * (0.012) 
  Comp School*Farm 0.043 * (0.010) 0.040 * (0.010) 
  Comp School*Low SEI 0.123 * (0.011) 0.113 * (0.011) 





2  EGP Lower Non-Manual -0.021   (0.020) -0.002   (0.020) 
  Skilled Manual -0.074 * (0.012) -0.061 * (0.012) 
  Non-Skilled Manual -0.149 * (0.011) -0.136 * (0.011) 
  Agriculture -0.127 * (0.010) -0.117 * (0.010) 
  Comp School -0.088 * (0.013) -0.086 * (0.013) 
  Comp School*Lower Non-Manual 0.015   (0.023) -0.002   (0.022) 
  Comp School*Skilled Manual 0.052 * (0.014) 0.042 * (0.014) 
  Comp School*Non-Skilled Manual 0.110 * (0.013) 0.099 * (0.013) 
  Comp School*Agriculture 0.087 * (0.012) 0.080 * (0.012) 





3  Nativity Foreign -0.137 * (0.019) -0.126 * (0.019) 
  Comp School -0.014 * (0.011) -0.018 * (0.011) 
  Foreign*Comp School 0.094 * (0.025) 0.075 * (0.025) 





4  Race Non-White -0.212 * (0.011) -0.214 * (0.010) 
  Comp School -0.023 * (0.011) -0.029 * (0.011) 
  Non-White*Comp School 0.119 * (0.016) 0.141 * (0.016) 





                
5  Naïve Comp School -0.012   (0.011) -0.016   (0.011) 
 





* p<.05; + p<.10    
Sources: 1850-1920 Census data; ICPSR (1970) Historical Census Data 1790-1970; US Bureau of the Census 
1975; Behrens et al. 2003.   
State level regression models in Table S7A include state and year fixed effects, as well as controls for state 
measures related to the timing of compulsory laws prior to 1895. Controlling for measures related to timing 
of the laws in all states gives the same results.  States are weighted by the population of young men or women 
ages 6-13, but results are similar without weights.   
Each model represents a separate regression. Model 5 shows the naïve approach with no interaction.  
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Table S7B: Coefficients from State Analysis of Attendance Rate in Non-Southern and 
Southern States by Class, Nativity, and Race 
Model   Attendance Rate 
    Young Men Young Women 
    Non-South South Non-South South 
1  SEI Farm (SEI=14) -0.022 * -0.117 * -0.020 * -0.106 * 
  Low SEI (SEI<14) -0.112 * -0.236 * -0.107 * -0.213 * 
  Comp School -0.029 * -0.058 * -0.041 * -0.056 * 
  Comp School*Farm 0.012 
 
0.033 * 0.009 
 
0.029 + 
  Comp School*Low SEI 0.075 * 0.117 * 0.070 * 0.107 * 
  N (state-status group-years) 533   306   526 
 
305   
2  EGP Lower Non-Manual -0.016 
 
-0.046   -0.012 
 
-0.012   
  Skilled Manual -0.043 * -0.108 * -0.027 * -0.100 * 
  Non-Skilled Manual -0.092 * -0.232 * -0.077 * -0.220 * 
  Agriculture -0.050 * -0.212 * -0.035 * -0.206 * 
  Comp School -0.041 * -0.105 * -0.038 * -0.111 * 
  Comp School*Lower Non-Manual 0.014 
 
0.028   0.010 
 
-0.005   
  Comp School*Skilled Manual 0.031 * 0.046 + 0.014 
 
0.062 * 
  Comp School*Non-Skilled Manual 0.063 * 0.142 * 0.049 * 0.138 * 
  Comp School*Agriculture 0.029 * 0.090 * 0.013   0.098 * 
  N (state-occupation group-years) 872   499   872 
 
498   
3  Nativity Foreign -0.158 * -0.045   -0.146 * -0.073   
  Comp School -0.015 
 
-0.016   -0.021 * -0.016   
  Foreign*Comp School 0.124 * -0.095   0.104 * -0.089   
  N (state-nativity group-years) 351 
 
181   353 
 
182   
4  Race Non-White -0.245 * -0.198 * -0.231 * -0.203 * 
  Comp School -0.012 
 
-0.038 + -0.020 * -0.043 * 
  Non-White*Comp School 0.158 * 0.083 * 0.157 * 0.109 * 
  N (state-race group-years) 329 
 
193   337 
 
194   
 * p<.05; + p<.10 
Sources: 1850-1920 Census data; ICPSR (1970) Historical Census Data 1790-1970; US Bureau of the Census 
1975; Behrens et al. 2003.   
State level regression models in Table S7B include state and year fixed effects, as well as controls for state 
measures related to the timing of compulsory laws prior to 1895. Controlling for measures related to timing 
of the laws in all states gives the same results.  States are weighted by the population of young men or women 
ages 6-13, but results are similar without weights.   




                                                 
1 While important, I do not investigate changes in the quality of schooling received (Lucas 2001). Potential 
compulsory effects on quality could counteract equalizing effects on attendance or attainment, but are beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
2 Preliminary analyses investigate state characteristics that best predict the timing of the first compulsory school 
attendance law in each state (results available upon request). These characteristics are controlled in this 
analysis. Among states with early (pre-1895) laws, these include: % white illiteracy, % manufacturing 
employment, % foreign, % elderly, % adjacent states with the law, years in the union, a governor from the 
Democratic Party, and manufacturing production per employee. Among all states, the best-fitting model 
includes an indicator for states in the Southern census region, % illiterate, % manufacturing employment, % 
non-white prisoners, and incarceration rate. For simplicity, all models control for measures best predicting 
early laws, but results are similar when controlling for measures that best predict the timing for all states. 
3 Compulsory laws most often applied to ages 8 to 14. This sample excludes older children because employment 
experience was valued for young adults, leaving little influence for schooling laws. A central goal of these laws 
was to prevent truant youth without jobs from being on the street. As long as they had some schooling, 
compulsory attendance was not likely enforced among older (over age 13), employed youth (Tyack 1974).  
4 Literacy is an alternate measure and would address questions of skills gained from schooling. However, literacy 
is not recorded for children in early censuses and is nearly universal among adults in the 1940 sample. 
5 Ganzeboom et al. (1992) note several advantages to continuous measures of occupational status and find that their 
international socio-economic index compares favorably with the classic Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portacarero (EGP 
1979) scheme. Specifically, Ganzeboom et al. suggest that: 1) some EGP categories are not internally homogeneous, 
with different mobility chances for some occupations in the same EGP category; 2) multivariate analysis is more 
feasible with continuous measures; and 3) log-linear analyses can scale EGP categories on one dimension and 
measure class distance without much loss of information. Nevertheless, there are also important reasons to 
incorporate categorical analyses (Wright 1980; 1985). For example, the high proportion of farming families could 
skew results using continuous measures. Analyses of both continuous and categorical measures provide a better 
proxy of class; categorical results are in the appendix. 
6 Morgan and Tang provide EGP categories for the 1980 and 1990 census occupation codes. The IPUMS census data 
include 1950 census occupation codes. I convert 1950 to 1990 census codes using the 1950 census, which includes 
standardized occupation codes for both 1950 and 1990. Like Morgan and Tang, I am unable to distinguish managers 
by how many workers they supervise; EGP category one may therefore include more low-level managers than 
appropriate. The early censuses do not include self-employment information; like Morgan and Tang’s labor market 
earnings analysis, I am therefore unable to distinguish self-employed individuals and create no EGP category IV. 
7 When estimating effects of the laws in all states, the sample is limited to those at least age 25 in 1940, to drop as 
many irrelevant cases while still ensuring that there are some individuals in each state who were required to 
attend school during all of their school age years. For example, Mississippi was the last state to pass the law (in 
1918). Individuals age 25 in 1940 would have been 3 when the law was passed if they lived in Mississippi, and 
required to attend from the time they became school age. Results are similar using different age cutoffs. 
8 Three-way interactions between compulsory law, father’s SEI, and nativity or race are not significant (when 
including all two-way interactions) and are not included in the model. 
9 State and cohort indicators are higher for those required to attend school, so the predicted likelihood of 
attendance is higher among youth required to attend school, despite the negative estimate of compulsory 
assignment. 
10 Many thanks to Jeff Manza, Christopher Uggen, and Angela Behrens for generously sharing their data. 
11 Because there are 3 status groups (low, farm, and high SEI scores), there are 3 measures for each state in each 
census year. The 1890 individual census was burned in a fire, so observations from that year are missing. 
Therefore, there are at most 1,008 possible state-status-year observations (7 censuses x 3 status groups x 48 
states – excluding Alaska and Hawaii). However, because several states were formed in the period from 1850 to 
1920 (e.g., Arizona in 1912 and Oklahoma in 1907), data are not available for them in early years. The number 
of state-status-year observations is therefore less than 1,000. 
